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Li Wenliang, a face to the frontline healthcare worker. The ﬁrst
doctor to notify the emergence of the SARS-CoV-2, (COVID-19),
outbreak
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journal home page: www.elsevier .com/ locat e/ i j idDr Li Wenliang, who lost his life to the novel coronavirus, SARS-
CoV-2, became the face of the threat of SARS-CoV-2 to frontline
workers, the clinicians taking care of patients. Li, 34, was an
ophthalmologist at Wuhan Central Hospital. On 30th December,
2019, when the Wuhan municipal health service sent out an alert,
he reportedly warned a closed group of ex-medical school
classmates on the WeChat social media site of “Seven cases of
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) like illness with links
with the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market” at his hospital. He
was among eight people reprimanded by security ofﬁcers for
“spreading rumours”. In a tragic turn of events, he subsequently
contracted SARS-CoV-2 and, after a period in intensive care, died
on the morning of Friday 7th February, 2020 (South China Morning
Post, 2020).
This case is a stark reminder of the risks of emerging disease
outbreaks for healthcare workers (HCWs). Dr Li Wenliang’s name is
added to the long list of HCW that were at the forefront of outbreaks
of SARS, Ebola, MERS and now SARS-CoV-2. It is important to
recognise that it was the clinicians in Wuhanwho sounded the alarm
about the emergence of SARS-CoV-2 which was rapidly identiﬁed
after these clinicians sent samples to a reference laboratory for next
generation sequencing (NGS) (Zhou et al., 2020).
Global public health security is of primary importance to
prevent outbreaks of diseases with epidemic potential and every
effort to detect, report, and institute infection prevention and
control measures should be made. Astute clinicians, access to
laboratories with state of the art tools, and openness, transparency
and quick reporting are crucial components of this response
(Kavanagh, 2020). This requires an open ﬂow of information and
collaboration between laboratory experts and clinicians on the
frontline who may be the ﬁrst to observe unusual clustering of
cases or uncommon clinical presentations, both of which should be
reported immediately.
Healthcare workers are also one of the groups most at risk from
outbreaks due to reemerging and novel pathogens. This has been
seen in the current SARS-CoV-2 outbreak in China where as many
as 1716 health workers have been reported to be infected by the
virus with 6 deaths as on 14th February, 2020 (WHO, 2020a). In a
single center case series of SARS-CoV-2 from Wuhan published
recently, almost 29% of all patients were healthcare workershttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijid.2020.02.052
1201-9712/© 2020 Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International Society for Infect
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).presumed to have been infected in the hospital (Wang et al.,
2020b).
The preliminary sequence data on the case cluster were
obtained by NGS of specimens collected on 26th December 2019
through 7 January 2020 (Lu et al., 2020). The Chinese authorities
ruled out SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV, and conﬁrmed a novel
coronavirus as the probable cause on 9th January, 2020 (Hui
et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2020a). The ﬁrst genome sequence was
released on virological.org the 12th January 2020, seventeen days
after obtaining the ﬁrst specimen and several additional genomic
sequences were then shared on GISAID (Wang et al., 2020c). This is
an impressive rapid progression from initial outbreak notiﬁcation
to identiﬁcation of a novel pathogen.
The rapid identiﬁcation of the SARS-CoV-2 virus by NGS
illustrates the advances in molecular identiﬁcation since the SARS-
CoV (2003) and MERS-CoV (2012) outbreaks, where both viruses
were initially identiﬁed by in vitro cell culture. Thus, clinician of
the possibility of a new infectious disease coupled with NGS can
serve to quickly identify novel pathogens and allow for the rapid
initiation of control measures to reduce further spread and
potentially prevent large-scale outbreaks.
The SARS-CoV outbreak originating from China in 2003 was
ﬁrst reported to the global health community by ProMED (ProMED,
2003; Carrion and Madoff, 2017; Hamer et al., 2017). It took six
weeks for the authorities to acknowledge the outbreak had spread
signiﬁcantly from Guangdong throughout China after cases were
reported from Hong Kong, Hanoi, Singapore, and Toronto.
In reporting the existence of a new respiratory disease to the
WHO on December 31 st, the Chinese authorities formally
acknowledged the outbreak much sooner this time, perhaps in
part because of the ongoing spread of information on informal
social media networks. ProMED posted the initial report of the
unknown pneumonia outbreak in Wuhan on 30 December 2019
(ProMED, 2019). Since then, transmission of information has been
relatively transparent, with the prompt sharing of the sequence of
the virus and actual numbers of cases reported on a daily basis. The
case ﬁgures have demonstrated the upward trajectory of the rapid
spread of SARS-CoV-2 from Wuhan and Hubei Province to all of
China.
On 13th February 2020 the Chinese authorities changed the
case deﬁnition and the number of newly reported cases over theious Diseases. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
206 E. Petersen et al. / International Journal of Infectious Diseases 93 (2020) 205–207prior 24 h jumped to 14,886 from a previous high of 4370 on 6th
February 2020. This was not a real increase, but reﬂected the
addition of the cumulative number of clinically diagnosed cases
(without laboratory conﬁrmation) to the reported number of
laboratory conﬁrmed cases and demonstrates how easily a case
deﬁnition can inﬂuence numbers. On 19 February 2020, the
Chinese authorities changed the case deﬁnition to include
laboratory conﬁrmed cases only and designating clinically diag-
nosed cases as suspected cases. This resulted in a rapid drop of
daily newly conﬁrmed cases, again demonstrating the impact of
case deﬁnition on reported case numbers. As of 23 February 2020,
WHO has reported a total of 78,007 cases with 2,462 deaths
globally with reports of cases from 29 countries (WHO, 2020a,b).
A key question remains “what is the real number of people
infected since many cases may be mild or asymptomatic?” A recent
modelling estimated the population attack rate to be between 0.75
per 100,000 to 15.8 per 100,000 analysing rates down to prefecture
level in China (Yang et al., 2020). Any determination of incidence
will likely be an underestimate since it will not include mild and
asymptomatic cases. Accuracy of such estimates will depend on
the development of sensitive and speciﬁc serologic tests.
Recognizing disease in travelers is a particularly important
aspect of surveillance for the importation of emerging infections.
Multi-site collaborations such as the GeoSentinel Surveillance
Network (Wilder-Smith and Boggild, 2018) can act as sentinel
systems to recognize new patterns of disease in travelers from
speciﬁc areas. Previous GeoSentinel data showed that despite
receiving care at specialized post-travel medicine sites, up to 40%
of returning ill travellers with febrile illness do not have a
conﬁrmed etiology; frequently no speciﬁc diagnostic testing is
available to identify a cause (Freedman et al., 2006; Wilson et al.,
2007; Leder et al., 2013). The current large-scale outbreak of a
novel pathogen, SARS-CoV-2, highlights the critical importance of
prioritizing the identiﬁcation of disease etiology through clinician
awareness and modern laboratory techniques such as NGS.
There has been widespread mourning of the sad demise of Dr Li
from COVID-2019. Dr Li Wenliang’s example as an astute clinician
should inspire all of us to be vigilant, bold and courageous in
reporting unusual clinical presentations. The SARS-CoV-2 outbreak
underscores the responsibilities and the vulnerabilities of frontline
health care workers in tackling novel and highly transmissible
pathogens. We must use our knowledge and skills, with the backup
of laboratory support, to rapidly detect and report any suspicion of
emerging infections. Rapid, transparent communication is para-
mount when infectious diseases emerge. This is the only way to
prevent major outbreaks and will save many lives.
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